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The role of multinational enterprises (hereina er MNEs) in world trade has increased dramatically over the last 20 years. The growth of MNEs presents increasingly complex taxation issues for both tax administrations and the MNEs themselves since separate country rules for the taxation of MNEs cannot be viewed in isolation but must be addressed in a broad international context. These issues arise primarily from the practical diffi culty, for both MNEs and tax administrations, of determining the income and expenses of a company or a permanent establishment that is part of an MNE group that should be taken into account within a jurisdiction, particularly where the MNE group's operations are highly integrated.
In applying the separate entity approach to intragroup transactions, individual group members must be taxed on the basis that they act at arm's length in their transactions with each other. However, the relationship among members of an MNE group may permit the group members to establish special conditions in their intra-group relations that diff er from those that would have been established had the group members been acting as independent enterprises operating in open markets. To ensure the correct application of the separate entity approach, OECD 1 member countries 2 have adopted the arm's length principle, under which the eff ect of special conditions on the levels of profi ts should be eliminated. The arm's length principle is incorporated in the Art. 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model Tax Convention), which forms the basis of the extensive network of bilateral income tax treaties between OECD member countries, and between OECD member and non-member countries. The same principle is also incorporated in the Model United Nations Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Nations.
In applying the arm's length principle, one of the most diffi cult issues that have arisen is how determine appropriate transfer prices 3 for tax purposes. Transfer prices are signifi cant for both taxpayers and tax administrations because they determine in large part the income and expenses, and therefore taxable profi ts of associated enterprises 4 in diff erent tax jurisdictions. The Committee on Fiscal Aff airs has issued a number of reports relating to transfer pricing issues of MNEs. The most important report is the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Authorities (hereina er Transfer Pricing Guidelines) which was published in 1995 and revised in 2010. These Transfer Pricing Guidelines focus on the application of the arm's length principle to evaluate the transfer pricing of associated enterprises, the analysis of the methods for evaluating whether the conditions of commercial and fi nancial relations within MNEs satisfy the arm's length principle, discussion of the practical application of those methods and other transfer pricing compliance issues.
However, applying the arm's length principle can be a resource-intensive process, because it may impose a heavy administrative burden on taxpayers and tax administrations. It may require collection and analysis of data that may be diffi cult or costly to obtain and/or evaluate. Moreover, such compliance burdens may be disproportionate to the size of the taxpayer, its functions performed, and the transfer pricing risks assumed in its controlled transactions. Furthermore, MNEs have been faced daily by confl icting rules and approaches to applying the arm's length principle, burdensome documentation requirements, inconsistent audit standards and unpredictable competent authority outcomes. Although Transfer Pricing Guidelines 5 emphasis that documentation requirements should be reasonable and should not impose on taxpayers costs and burdens disproportionate to the circumstances. Therefore, greater simplicity in transfer pricing administration and improving the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of transfer pricing enforcement are really essential. These facts led OECD, namely the Committee on Fiscal Aff airs to launch a project to improve the administrative aspects of transfer pricing and compliance issues in 2010.
The project started with a survey of the transfer pricing techniques that may be implemented by countries to optimise the use of taxpayers' and tax administrations' resources. . The results of the survey were surprising. When the Transfer Pricing Guidelines were adopted in 1995 and further revised in 2010, the view on safe harbours was generally negative. It was suggested that safe harbours may not be compatible with the 3 Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises. 4 Associated enterprise is an enterprise that satisfi es the conditions set forth in Article 9, sub-paragraphs 1a) and 1b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Under these conditions, two enterprises are associated if one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the other or if "the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital" of both enterprises. 5 OECD: Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para 3. 80-3.83, 5.6-5.7 and 5.28. 6 A safe harbour in a transfer pricing regime is a provision that applies to a defi ned category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a country's general transfer pricing rules. A safe harbour substitutes simpler obligations for those under the general transfer pricing regime. For more details see p. 5 below. 7 Namely Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union. 8 OECD: Multi-country analysis of existing transfer pricing simplifi cation measures, 2011, 2012. arm's length principle, and therefore safe harbours are not advisable and recommended. However, based on the results of the survey, this negative tone does not accurately refl ect the practice of OECD and non-OECD member countries. Moreover, safe harbours were also explicitly endorsed in the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (hereina er EU JTPF) report "Transfer Pricing and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises" as a means of providing a measure of simplifi cation for SMEs as well as saving on administrative resources and reducing compliance burden 9 . Furthermore in other EU JTPF report "Guidelines on Low Value Adding IntraGroup Services" is also mentioned a safe harbour approach. Based on this approach low value adding services are valuated by mark-up in the range of 3-10%, o en around 5%
10
. Thus the Committee on Fiscal Aff airs started to work on the review of the current guidance on safe harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. On 6 June 2012, a discussion dra on safe harbours was released for public comments. The discussion dra included proposed revisions of the section E on safe harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and associated sample memoranda of understanding for competent authorities to establish bilateral safe harbours, which was not introduced in current Chapter IV. Public comments on safe harbours were submitted by 35 private sector organizations, totalizing 237 pages and presenting the importance of the proposal for the business community. During November 2012 Meeting received public comments were discussed and fi nally on 16 May 2013 the OECD Council approved the Revised Section E on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a partial solution of the project about administrative aspects and compliance issues of transfer pricing. In addition is important to mention that the current UN Transfer Pricing Manual also contain a comprehensive and pragmatic discussion of safe harbour provisions. Thus, policy-makers and tax administrations across developed and developing countries try to ensure a globally consistent approach of safe harbour provisions.
The paper is focused on signifi cant changes of newly approved Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, further on analysis of practice in this area, on advantages and disadvantages of safe harbours for taxpayers and competent authorities with aim to suggest recommendations on use of safe harbours in the Czech Republic.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The basic source of our research was previous and now revised section E on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer pricing Guidelines. The next source was public comments to discussion dra on Safe Harbours. In addition, the last sources were the reports about multi-country analysis of existing transfer pricing simplifi cation measures issued by OECD in 2011 and 2012.
Within the paper, the analysis and synthesis as scientifi c methods were used to introduction of (i) the main changes in section E on Safe Harbours, and (ii) advantages and disadvantages of safe harbours. Furthermore those methods were used in evaluation of the practice, public comments and experiences in this area. In addition, the others methods, namely induction and deduction were applied in the process of the suggestion of recommendations on use of safe harbours as a fi nal result. However, thin capitalization rules, advance pricing arrangements and other administrative simplifi cation measures which do not directly involve determination of arm's length prices are not within the scope of the safe harbours discussion.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tone of the benefi ts of safe harbours is slightly more positive as compared with guidance in the 1995 or in 2010. Safe harbours should be now appropriate at taxpayers and/or transactions which involve low transfer pricing risks and when they are adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In this case the tax administrations can shi audit and examination resources from smaller taxpayers and less complex transactions to more complex, higherrisk cases. Safe harbours would result in a greater administrative simplicity for tax administrations, mainly due to minimal examination requirements with respect to the transfer prices of controlled Nevertheless, there are also identifi ed some concerns in subsection E.4 of the new guidance, for example concerns about the degree of approximation to arm's length prices that would be permitted in determining transfer prices under safe harbour rules for eligible taxpayers -divergence from the arm's length principle. According to the new guidance, the degree of approximation could be improved by collecting, collating, and frequently updating a pool of information regarding prices and pricing developments of transactions between uncontrolled parties. But, such eff orts could erode the administrative simplicity of the safe harbours. Furthermore, this potential disadvantage (divergence from the arm's length principle) can be eliminated by the option to either choose the safe harbour or general transfer pricing rules. However, in this regard, it is desirable to set detail conditions under which a taxpayer is eligible for the safe harbour.
Further concern identifi ed in the safe harbour is the potential for creating inappropriate tax planning opportunities including double nontaxation of income, the potential for double taxation from the possible incompatibility of the safe harbours with the arm's length principle or with the practices of other countries -risk of double taxation or double non-taxation, and inappropriate tax planning. In respect of double taxation, the higher risk is in case where safe harbours are adopted unilaterally. Moreover, if the safe harbour causes taxpayers to report income above arm's length level, the jurisdiction providing the safe harbour receives a benefi t in the form of higher taxable income, on the other hand, the other jurisdiction generates a loss in the form of less taxable income. Furthermore, the other jurisdiction can make a transfer pricing adjustment with the result that the taxpayer applying the safe harbour would face double taxation. In addition, the administrative burden saved by the jurisdiction providing the safe harbour would therefore be shi ed to the other jurisdiction. Thus it is desirable to fully inform taxpayers applying the safe harbour about any eventual double taxation risks. In respect of double non-taxation or undertaxation, this situation can be identifi ed, if unilateral safe harbour permits taxpayers to report income below arm's length level. Then there would be a high incentive to apply the safe harbour. On the other hand, the burden of undertaxation would be fall upon the jurisdiction providing the safe harbour and double nontaxation would be unavoidable and could result in distortions of investment and trade. Both problems (double taxation and double non-taxation) could be eliminated by bilateral or multilateral agreements 11 . In addition, for smaller taxpayers and/or less complex transactions would be considered this approach as transfer pricing simplifi cation which could avoid some disadvantages of an unilateral safe harbour regime. In respect of possibility of inappropriate tax planning, safe harbours could provide taxpayers this opportunity. For instance, if safe harbours apply to simple or small transactions, then taxpayers can break own transactions up into parts to make them seem simple or small. Further, if safe harbours were based on an industry average, then taxpayers with better than average profi tability, can shi the remaining percentages of profi tability to a lower tax jurisdiction. However, as was mentioned above, this problem could be eliminated by bilateral or multilateral agreements. Especially, if the agreement is concluded with countries having similar tax rates, which eliminate the possibility that safe harbour provision itself would create opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation.
The last concern identifi ed in the safe harbour is an equitable treatment of similarly situated taxpayers -equity and uniformity issues. In this respect, it is desirable to set clearly and carefully designed criteria for diff erentiate those taxpayers or transactions eligible for the safe harbour provision. On the other hand in the new guidance is mentioned that the preferential tax treatment for specifi c category of taxpayers could create discrimination and competitive distortions. Moreover, the bilateral or multilateral agreements could also increase the potential of a divergence in tax treatment.
In addition, the new guidance is relatively innovative, as includes the possibility of bilateral or multilateral agreements establishing a safe harbour contrary with the guidance in 1995 or in 2010. Thus the new guidance more refl ects actual situation in OECD member countries or OECD non-member countries. As a few countries adopted safe harbours for dealing with common types of transfer pricing issues, mainly for low value adding services, SMEs or loans. Further, the general view of countries having adopted a bilateral agreement is that the bilateral agreement should be characterised as a "mutual agreement" under Art. 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and that "resolves diffi culties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application" of Art. 9 of the Treaty. In annex I to Chapter IV of Transfer Pricing Guidelines are presented three sample memoranda, one for low-risk distribution functions, one for low-risk manufacturing functions, and one for low-risk research and development functions. Competent authorities are free to modify, add or delete any provision of the sample agreement when concluding their own bilateral or multilateral agreements. However, there can be asked, whether such kind of distribution, manufacturing and research and development activities are really good candidates for a safe harbour?
Safe harbours practice
The survey OECD on existing transfer pricing simplifi cation measures presents that 33 12 out of 41 respondent countries have transfer pricing simplifi cation measures, and especially 16 countries 13 of them (39% of respondent or 49% of respondent having simplifi cation measures) have safe harbours in the total amount of 23. The types of safe harbours in place shows following graph 1.
Almost 35% of safe harbours identifi ed are exemption from transfer pricing rules/adjustments, simplifi ed transfer pricing method and safe harbour arm's length range/rate are followed by 26%, and safe harbour interest rate (arm's length rate) is followed by 13%. When looking at taxpayers or transactions which are entitled to safe harbour benefi ts, 30% of safe harbours are directed at low value adding intragroup services, 26% of them are directed at loans, 22% are directed at SMEs, and 9 % are directed at small transaction (for details see graph 2).
Further it is worth noting, that safe harbours such as simplifi ed transfer pricing methods, safe harbour arm's length ranges/rates and safe harbour interest rates are optional. Due to this fact, there is no country reported double taxation cases related to the application of either own or another country's simplifi cation measures. In addition, almost all optional safe harbours are directed at low value adding intra-group services and loans (for details see Tab. I).
The last key fi ndings from the survey were related to the administrative practices and assessing the eff ectiveness of safe harbours. Majority of respondents using safe harbours generally evaluated safe harbours favourably and indicated them as simplifi cation measures which alleviate compliance costs of taxpayers and tax administration, and increase certainty of taxpayers as well.
Public comments to guidance
Considering public comments to the discussion dra on the revision of the safe harbours section of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 14 , the vast majority of commentators support the OECD's initiative to enable the simplifi cation of transfer pricing issues through the extension of safe harbours 1: Types of safe harbours Source: OECD, Multi-country analysis of existing transfer pricing simplifi cation measures, 2012.
12 Namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 13 Namely Australia, Austria, Columbia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. 14 OECD: The comments received with respect to the discussion dra on the revision of the safe harbours section of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 2012. In respect of purposes and benefi ts of safe harbours commentators welcome the adoption of less stringent documentation requirements for eligible taxpayer or transactions or more generally the possibility to benefi t from simplifi ed administration and compliance processes. Commentators believe that safe harbours can provide a useful means of reducing the administration burden for taxpayers and tax authorities. Complying with transfer pricing requirements is a time-consuming and expensive consideration for taxpayers, mainly for MNEs. The availability of safe harbours may provide an opportunity to reduce the compliance cost for taxpayers, as well as permitting tax authorities to focus their limited resources on areas with the most signifi cant transfer pricing risk. Further, safe harbours may enable tax authorities to increase the effi ciency of their yield from transfer pricing enquiries and provide taxpayers with much-desired certainty. However, commentators agreed that there is a risk that poorly designed unilateral safe harbours could initially distort taxpayer behaviour in favour of the tax authority off ering the safe harbour. In this respect there can arise some risk, particularly audit and adjustment by the tax authority in the counterparty country under the arm's length principle and the issue of whether the country off ering the safe harbour would be prepared to allow mutual agreement adjustment in consequence. On the other hand, well-designed, appropriate safe harbours should not distort taxpayer behaviour, but should provide administrative certainty.
Thus, safe harbours have the potential to signifi cantly reduce the compliance burden of taxpayers and the resource dedication of tax authorities, provided they are welldesigned in line with the arm's length principle and applied based on a careful evaluation of the facts and circumstances. Furthermore, safe harbours could serve to simplify transfer pricing rules across jurisdictions, thereby aiding business competitiveness on regional and global scales. A er that it will be achieve an eff ective outcome that preserves tax revenues and increase certainty while reducing the administrative burden on business without the framework for doing so creating complexity that swaps one set of administrative requirements for another. However, revised guidance does not include any safe harbours related to a simplifi cation of documentation. In commentators view, it should be possible to implement a safe harbour whereby certain transactions below certain amounts, involving "regular" income tax rate countries, etc., are exempt from the stringent requirement of preparing contemporaneous documentation. But, taxpayers would still have the burden of answering any question or issue raised during an audit of such transactions, if such an audit nonetheless occurred.
Considering of taxpayers, benefi ts of safe harbours are potentially greatest for SMEs / small MNEs or those in the early stages of cross-border expansion. These businesses may not possess the resources for detailed transfer pricing studies in multiple territories but have the same desire for the certainty that comes from eff ective compliance. Particularly, there are two benefi ts for taxpayers in having bilateral safe harbours off ered by tax 
authorities: lower compliance costs and certainty.
Mainly in the areas of low transfer pricing risk where compliance costs are perhaps disproportionately high and there remains no certainty that transfer prices will not be subjected to tax authority audit in one or more countries. Further, the process of conducting bilateral safe harbours starts with critical assumptions which, if met by the parties, would determine the pricing. From this point of view, the bilateral safe harbours can be considered as an alternative form of APA / simplifi ed APA, if cover low risk transactions not to eligible for a normal APA and the costs of obtaining an APA may be prohibitive where the volume of transactions is low. In addition, multilateral agreements are likely to be the most useful to bigger MNEs. However, experience from APA shows that multilateral agreements are rarer and more labour intensive to conclude that bilateral equivalents. As such, the OECD's focus on providing bilateral sample memoranda of understanding is a practical one. In addition, bilateral (or multilateral) agreements clearly allow for the optimal compromise between certainty, compliance simplicity, risk management and fair allocation of taxing rights. However, unilateral rulings do provide benefi ts in that they are less time-consuming and simpler to manage. Moreover, the unilateral safe harbours have also a role to play for small transactions and SMEs for which a bilateral process may be overly costly. Furthermore, countries have diff erent attitudes, diff erent eff ective tax rates and/ or unbalanced taxing powers in the relationship with taxpayers, a unilateral safe harbour may be the most practical and benefi cial instrument both to taxpayers and tax authorities to achieve certainty, respectively, on tax burden and collections. On the other hand, unilateral safe harbours only protect taxpayers from adjustments by one of the two or more tax authorities with an interest in a transfer pricing transaction. Further, based on general practice many tax authorities do not respect or give any weight to the safe harbours off ered by other tax authorities. Under such circumstances, mandatory unilateral safe harbours may lead to a high risk of double taxation and/or the need to seek resolution in competent authority. In this respect is essential, that the opportunity to apply for mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is not reduced in case a safe harbour. Therefore, all commentators agreed that safe harbours should be optional for taxpayers, because a taxpayer should have the choice as to whether to apply a safe harbour or to follow the general principles of the arm's length standard when demonstrating that related party transactions are correctly priced. Only such optional approach would achieve the desired compliance relief for taxpayers, and allow for suffi cient fl exibility, especially in case of unilateral safe harbours. However, bilateral safe harbours off er more protection against double taxation, and therefore have advantages over unilateral safe harbours.
Considering of tax authorities, benefi ts of safe harbours are also identifi ed in allowing a focus of resources on complex and high risk transfer pricing matters. With better case selection and development, tax authorities may actually save costs and increase enforcement revenue. Further, use of bilateral or even multilateral agreements has the potential to signifi cantly decrease the number of transfer pricing disputes, audit and MAP cases.
In respect of the form and scope of safe harbours commentators suggest that safe harbours can be either qualitative or quantitative, setting margins or de minimums thresholds below which a country's transfer pricing regulations would not apply. However, revised guidance does not consider quantitative safe harbours but only qualitative safe harbours. Therefore commentators suggest for establishing parameters around safe harbours that each tax jurisdiction could undertake to analyse its administration of transfer pricing transactions along the following lines:
• Number of transfer pricing audits undertaken in a year (including audits resulting in no adjustments).
• Number of hours spent by auditors, appeals offi cers, competent authority staff and attorneys in fi nalizing transfer pricing audits, and related costs (including external costs).
• Type of transaction and transfer pricing methodology used by the taxpayer. • Taxpayer's fi ling position vs. fi nal resolution of case. Further, the above information shall be broken down into various categories such as size of taxpayer, size of transaction and type of transaction, then a matrix should emerge indicating where most of the risk lies and, conversely, which areas are not worth the tax authorities' time. Thus, it should indicate areas which are better for investing both the tax authorities' and taxpayers' resources by implementing safe harbour rules.
Moreover, it is suggested to design safe harbour provisions based on a sound evaluation of past experience with arm's length transfer pricing for a certain type of transaction/taxpayer for elimination of the risk of divergence from the arm's length principle. Some commentators also suggest that the design of safe harbour provisions may need to take into account industry specifi cities and refl ect industry comparability. However, this approach requires additional guidance on what factors to take into consideration when designing safe harbour provisions, which as a general principle should be set based on consistent past experience rather than arbitrariness and which should be properly monitored going-forward. Then, due to potentially infl uencing business and product cycles could be more reliable for certain types of transactions or industries a multi-year approach testing weighted average results. In addition, taxpayers should always have the option to apply arm's length principle instead of any safe harbour. Therefore safe harbours should be off ered as an administrative simplifi cation rather than a move away from the arm's length principle.
Furthermore, commentators welcome that current guidance on safe harbours is applicable to less complex transactions, regardless of the size of the taxpayer concerned (thus also for MNEs), and then for small transactions and routine or low value adding transactions. Although some commentators believe that safe harbours should be designed in a way, that makes them available to eligible taxpayers, namely for SMEs. This approach is consistent with work done by the European Commission and EU JTPF on such enterprises.
Further, commentators recommend developing a list of example transactions which could normally be considered to be a low risk character and hence particularly suitable to be the subject of a unilateral or bilateral safe harbour arrangement. Commentators explicitly suggest to add to such list business support services, head offi ce and shared service centre services (low-value adding services), including e.g., IT support services, payroll or bookkeeping services. Within MNEs these types of services are o en centralized within one or multiple entities serving all group companies. Moreover, the inclusion of this type of services as an example for low-risk transactions suitable for safe harbour provisions would foster a consistent approach towards such type of transactions, especially in the light of the recent multilateral developments at the level of the EU (EU JTPF Guidelines on lowvalue adding services). In addition, commentators note that other transactions, particularly thin capitalization is a key issue for taxpayers and one which would benefi t from a safe harbour rule. In the end, commentators considered whether contract research and development is a good example of low risk activity in case of memoranda for understanding which is presented in guidance.
In respect of risk of double taxation and abusive tax planning, the commentators believe that safe harbours should not be designed in a way that increases risks of unresolved double taxation. Further, commentators suggest that for many tax authorities may be more comfortable to have a safe harbour that gives a taxpayer a strong presumption of correctness. But which nevertheless allows the tax authority to challenge a taxpayer's use of the sale harbour if that use is abusive or inconsistent with the purpose of the safe harbour. Moreover, safe harbours can be put in place for a period of time, and then withdrawn or amended if taxpayers are found to be abusing them. Or safe harbours can be put in place by a progressive development e.g., starting with small companies fi rst in order to test the concept before expanding it to larger taxpayers.
In addition, as transfer pricing is not an exact science, any unilateral safe harbour, if based on arm's length principles and ranges, should not lead to major exposure of double taxation or nontaxation by, thus, achieving an eff ective balance between certainty, compliance simplicity, risk management, and tax revenues collection. However, the safe harbours outcomes can never be exactly the same as with a full transfer pricing analysis.
Advantages and disadvantages of safe harbours
Based on analysis of new guidance, public comments and safe harbour practice can be identifi ed advantages and disadvantages of safe harbours with regard to the taxpayers and tax authorities.
For taxpayers and tax administrators mean safe harbours mainly simplifi ed transfer pricing approach that can reduce compliance costs and administration costs. Further, it also means higher certainty for taxpayers and improved eff ectiveness of tax administration mainly by decreasing the number of transfer pricing disputes, audit and MAP cases for tax administrators. On the other hand, there are some disadvantages, namely an application for specifi c category of taxpayers or transactions which can create discriminations or some distortions e.g. trade or competitive; risk of double taxation or non-taxation; inappropriate tax planning and transfer pricing manipulation with results of lower tax revenues and so on (for details see Tab. II).
Recommendations
In the beginning, there are mentioned common recommendations.
Subsequently, there are mentioned recommendations for the Czech tax policy which has not used any safe harbours provisions.
Transfer pricing compliance and administration is o en complex, time consuming and costly. Therefore, safe harbours can be considered as simplifi ed measures, which could fulfi l their benefi ts and advantages, provided that they are properly and clearly designed with conditions in details under which a taxpayer/transaction is eligible for safe harbour provision. Further, for elimination of negative impact on the tax revenues of the country implementing the safe harbour as well as on the countries whose associated enterprise engage in controlled transaction is recommended to use bilateral form of the safe harbour or nonmandatory unilateral safe harbour. Moreover is recommended to use a safe harbour provision mainly for less complex transactions e.g., small transactions, routine with lower risks or low value adding transactions, and for SMEs. This approach is consistent with work done by the European Commission and EU JTPF on such enterprises or transactions. However, it is questioned and le open whether also include business support services, head offi ce and shared service centre services, which are usually centralized and serving all group companies. Specifi cally, the Confederation Fiscale Europeenne believes that tax authorities should issue guidelines on the application of the cost plus method, for instance by saying that except in exceptional circumstances a cost plus 8% shall not be criticized in case of general headquarters services, cost plus 3%/5% for logistical centers, cost plus 1% for mere reinvoicing 15 . In the end, it is recommended to set safe harbour provisions in that way which allows tax authorities
II: Advantages and disadvantages safe harbours

Taxpayers
Advantages Disadvantages
Simplifi ed transfer pricing approach , which refl ect EU JTPF Guidelines on Low Value Adding Intra-Group Services. This decree GFŘ D-10 can be considered as transfer pricing simplifi cation measures, because if taxpayers met all conditions set in this decree, a er that is relieved from some transfer pricing documentation requirements.
In this respect it is recommended to consider whether the similar transfer pricing simplifi cation measures in the form of safe harbours introduce or not, particularly for SMEs or for transactions with low transfer pricing risks. These other two areas seem to be the most suitable for establishing safe harbours and would be positive evaluated by taxpayers who bear burdensome compliance costs, e.g., transfer pricing compliance costs have a disproportionate eff ect on SMEs relative to the size of transactions, and can be a barrier to international expansion for such businesses. Further, in these areas the tax authorities can expend resources, which could be used in more complex and higher-risk cases and improved tax administrative eff ectiveness. However, before making a decision and establishing parameters around safe harbours, the Czech tax authorities should analyse their administration of transfer pricing transactions, particularly number of transfer pricing audits, number of hours spent and related costs, type of transaction and methodology used, and categorization of taxpayers. Based on the results of analysis is possible to indicate areas which are suitable for safe harbours provisions. Therefore, the further research will be covered this analysis with the indication of the suitable areas for safe harbours provisions and with the determination of specifi c safe harbours arm's length range. In the end is worth to note that tax authorities should always carefully weigh the benefi ts / advantages and concerns / disadvantages regarding safe harbours. 
SUMMARY
OECD has been focused on improving the administrative aspects of transfer pricing and compliance issues since 2010. The fi rst fi nding from the survey were released in 2011 and then in 2012 were updated, which present analysis of existing transfer pricing simplifi cation measures (including safe harbours) in existence in OECD and non-OECD member countries. Based on the results of the survey, the negative view on safe harbours does not accurately refl ect the practice of OECD and non-OECD member countries and EU TJPF. Due to this fact, on 16 May 2013 the OECD Council approved the Revised Section E on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a partial solution of the project on the administrative aspects of transfer pricing. New guidance on safe harbours includes a new, clearer defi nition of safe harbours with more positive tone. However, the new defi nition does not cover thin capitalization rules and advance pricing agreements. The most important benefi ts of safe harbours were identifi ed as follows: simplifying compliance and reducing compliance costs; providing certainty; shi ing administrative resources to examinations of more complex or higher risks transactions and taxpayers; minimal examination requirements and others. On the other hands there were identifi ed some concerns, e.g., the possibility of divergence from the arm's length principle; risk of double taxation or double nontaxation; possibility of inappropriate tax planning; and equity and uniformity issues. However almost all concerns can be eliminated by both clearly and carefully designed criteria and conditions under which a taxpayer/transaction is eligible for safe harbours, and by bilateral or multilateral forms of safe harbours.
Furthermore, safe harbours practice shows that 49% of respondent having transfer pricing simplifi cation measures have safe harbours provisions. The types of safe harbours used are following: exemption from transfer pricing rules; simplifi ed transfer pricing method; safe harbour arm's length range/rate; and safe harbour interest rate. Further, all safe harbours used are optional and cover usually low value adding intra-group services, loans, SMEs and small transactions. For taxpayers and tax administrators mean safe harbours mainly simplifi ed transfer pricing approach that can reduce compliance costs and administration costs, increase certainty for taxpayers and improved eff ectiveness of tax administration mainly by decreasing the number of transfer pricing disputes, audit and MAP cases for tax administrators. On the other hand, there are some disadvantages, namely an application for specifi c category of taxpayers or transactions which can create discriminations or some distortions e.g. trade or competitive; risk of double taxation or nontaxation; inappropriate tax planning and transfer pricing manipulation with results of lower tax revenues.
At the end of the paper were made some recommendations for tax authorities who would like to introduce own safe harbours. They should properly and clearly designed conditions in details under which a taxpayer/transaction is eligible for safe harbour provision. Moreover this defi nition should allow tax authorities challenge a taxpayer's use of the sale harbour if that use is abusive or inconsistent with the purpose of the safe harbour. Further, they should use bilateral form of the safe harbour or non-mandatory unilateral safe harbour. In addition, safe harbour provisions should cover mainly less complex transactions e.g., small transactions, routine with lower risks or low value adding transactions, and SMEs. And the last recommendation is that the safe harbour's introduction should have progressive development. From the general view, the Czech tax policy has not used any safe harbour provisions. However, from 1 January 2013 is eff ective a new decree GFŘ D-10, which refl ect EU JTPF Guidelines on Low Value Adding Intra-Group Services. This decree can be considered as transfer pricing simplifi cation measures, because if taxpayers met all conditions set in this decree, a er that is relieved from some transfer pricing documentation requirements. Therefore, there are two other areas which can be identifi ed as a suitable area for safe harbour provisions, namely SMEs and transactions with low transfer pricing risks. Mainly due to the fact that transfer pricing compliance costs have a disproportionate eff ect on SMEs relative to the size of transactions, and can be a barrier to international expansion for such businesses. Further, in these areas the tax authorities can expend resources, which could be used in more complex and higher-risk cases and improve tax administrative eff ectiveness. However, before making a decision and establishing parameters around safe harbours, the Czech tax authorities should analyse their administration of transfer pricing transactions and carefully weigh the benefi ts / advantages and concerns / disadvantages regarding safe harbours. Therefore, the further research will be covered this analysis with the aim to determinate a specifi c safe harbours arm's length range in the selected areas. 
